ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

1
State highway agencies (SHAs) are under pressure to provide improved transportation 2 infrastructure in the satisfactory quality, time, and lifecycle cost as the public expectation increases 3 (1) . SHAs rely on construction contractors to build, rehabilitate, and replace their infrastructure 4 assets. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the SHAs want to ensure that the 5 contractors who will be awarded construction contracts are both technically competent and 6 financially capable of completing projects without risking bankruptcy. One risk mitigation tool 7 that is nearly ubiquitous is the performance bond, which essentially assures the owner that the 8 project will be completed even if the contractor defaults. Performance bond is an easy and efficient 9 contractor screening method for SHAs' large qualification process and is important especially for 10 large or complex transportation projects which may bring over a huge losses to SHAs when a 11 default occurs. However, this protection is not free and to require it forces the contractor to add 12 the cost of the bonding fee to the bid cost of construction, which is passed on to the agencies. 13 Accordingly, adjustment of the portion of a project value that requires a performance bond is a 14 research topic worth investigating. 15
This paper reports an evaluation of the benefits and costs of using performance bonds and 16 identifies the rationale for retaining the current performance bond system. The paper also relates 17 the outcome of the research and furnishes recommendations for restructuring the current system 18 from its present form to better balance the benefits of continued use of bonds with their actual 19 quantitative and qualitative costs in the context of highway construction contracting in the 21 st 20 century. 21 22 BACKGROUND 23
A performance bond is a promise from a surety that monetary compensation or contract completion 24 services will be provided to the owner if the contractor fails to complete all the services required 25 under the construction contract. Its primary function is to insulate the project's owner from 26 potential damages due to contractor default. Sureties' performance bonds hold State Departments 27 of Transportation (DOT) harmless in the event that a contractor fails to complete a bridge or 28 highway construction contract and then is unable to provide a remedy for the failure. Experience 29 has shown that the problem almost always arises from the contractor's deteriorated financial 30 condition (2). DOTs generally use one of three approaches for performance bonding: 31 1. Bond the entire contract value, 32 2. Bond a portion of the contract value, or 33 3. No performance bond requirement. 34
The Miller Act of 1935 made performance bonds a requirement for federal construction 35 work, and thus required any states that accepted federal funds for construction work to create their 36 own legal requirements for performance bonds (3). However, the percent of the contract value to 37 be bonded and the minimum contract value that requires a bond vary with the states. Each 38 individual state created its own specific Miller Act, known as ″little miller acts″ which define the 39 requirements for performance bonds. The amount of bond required also varies across the nation, 40 from 25 percent to 100 percent of the contract value. The vast majority of the states require a 41 performance bond for 100 percent of the value of the contract. The minimum contract size that 42 requires a performance bond also varies from state to state, and ranges from $0 to $300,000. 43
Most states require that performance bonds be secured for contracts over a specific dollar 44 amount, typically $25,000, although the minimum contract amount ranges from any dollar value 45 (in California) to a much higher values (in Indiana, where the minimum is $200,000). The required 46 performance bond coverage also varies by state, ranging from a portion of the contract amount to 1 the full contract amount. Performance bonding requirements may also extend to subcontractors 2 (4). For example, the Florida DOT (FDOT) requires that the secured performance bond value be 3 equal to the contract price, except for contracts greater than $250 million (an amount in excess of 4 which is generally too great for a single performance bond to be issued), or if the state otherwise 5 finds that a bond in the amount of the contract is not reasonably available, in which case the bond 6 amount will be set at the largest amount reasonably available. For contracts greater than 7 $250 million, FDOT can use a combination of bonds equal to a portion of the contract amount, 8 along with an alternative means of security applied to the remaining portion, such as letters of 9 credit, U.S. bonds and notes, parent company guarantees, and/or cash collateral to replace bond 10 requirements (4 Finally, the case study candidates were drawn from two sources: the literature and survey 7 responses indicating an agency's willingness to contribute a case study. The analysis occurred on 8 the following three levels: 9
1. General agency performance bonding and contractor evaluation policy 10 2. Specific agency constraints and preferences 11 3. Individual respondent perceptions and opinions 12
The authors used the case study method described by Yin (7) to furnish a rigorous 13 methodology for collecting the data from the case study projects, which maintains that planning 14 the process of accessing and collecting data is essential preparation for efficiently and accurately 15 collecting cogent information. Additionally, it is equally important to carefully select cases that 16
can be compared directly with one another and also offer cross-sectional diversity. The selected 17 sample fulfills this requirement in that there are a diverse set of agency statute, regulation and 18 policy constraints that were sampled as part of the case study.
19
While the collection of cases needs to cover the performance bonding spectrum in this 20 research, it is "important that the participant pool remain relatively small" (8). Although fewer 21 cases can sometimes lead to unsubstantiated research conclusions based on the probability of 22 atypical case selections, it provides a better opportunity to examine each case in detail without 23 becoming too cumbersome. Therefore, the information gleaned from the case studies is coupled 24 with information collected in the survey and the literature review to validate any conclusion drawn 25 from the case studies. Note the case study information was gathered by both face-to-face and 26 telephonic interviews. 27
To summarize, four outreach efforts were conducted to obtain feedback from the major 28 parties that are involved in the use of construction contract performance bonds. Representative 29 DOTs, DOT contractors, and sureties all participated in this outreach effort. The representative 30
DOTs completed surveys on their use of performance bonds, contractor evaluation methods, and 31 views on performance-based prequalification. Contractors also completed surveys to provide input 32 on the use of performance bonds and performance-based prequalification methods. The Surety 33
and Fidelity Association of America (SFAA) provided overall surety industry data, summarized 34 industry practices, and participated in interviews. The final step of the outreach effort was the 35 completion of case studies for five DOTs. 36 37
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PERFORMANCE BOND 38
The costs and benefits of performance bonds include both quantitative and qualitative aspects. 39
Objectively, one can determine the actual cost of bond premiums paid by an agency over a given 40 period and compare it to the estimated cost to the agency of defaulted contracts. In theory, those 41 numbers should be roughly equal as the agency is spending money for a financial instrument that 42 will protect it from exposure to defaults. Qualitatively, some authors argue that the requirement to 43 furnish a performance bond filters out most, if not all, of the default risk (3). Others also argue that 44 the threat of an owner contacting a contractor's surety to warn them of a potential termination 45 through default due to poor quality work or untimely execution creates incentivizes marginal 46 contractors to correct their behavior for fear that they will not be able to bid on future work because 1 their surety has decided to cease furnishing the requisite bonds (9). The surety industry also argues 2 that owners are the recipient of a benefit accrued when the surety recognizes that a contractor is 3 failing and steps in and corrects the issue, preventing default (10). This action is typically called a 4 "near miss." Therefore, the following analysis was done keeping both quantitative and qualitative 5 aspects in mind. Where it was impossible to accurately calculate a possible cost or a benefit, the 6 authors turned to the case study interviews to seek validation that the given factor actually occurred 7 in the highway construction sector and whether the DOT and contractor practitioners perceived 8 the factor as a real cost or benefit. 9 10
Performance Bond Costs 11
The costs of performance bonds for which the DOT is ultimately responsible are the performance 12 bond premium, passed through by the contractor in the bid, and DOT administrative costs 13 associated with the management of performance bonds. In addition, the surety industry rates each 14 contractor individually, in the context of a specific contract, and develops a separate premium for 15 each individual project performance bond. Accordingly, the determination of a generalized cost of 16 performance bonds is not a particularly straightforward task and it is nearly impossible to 17 generalize or infer a specific cost for the bonding of a given project. A work written by two eminent 18 construction researchers, Peurifoy and Oberlender (11), provides the following guidance: 19
All government agencies and many private owners require a contractor to furnish a 20 performance bond to last for the period of construction of a project. The bond is 21
furnished by an acceptable surety to ensure the owner that the work will be performed 22 by the contractor in accordance with the contract documents. In the event a contractor 23 fails to complete a project, it is the responsibility of the surety to secure completion. 24
Although the penalty under a performance bond is specified as 25, 50, or 100 percent 25 of the amount of the contract, the cost of the bond is usually based on the amount of the 26 contract and duration of the project (11). 27
The cost of a performance bond varies based on a number of factors, but is primarily based 28 on the capacity of the contractor to perform the work and the financial stability of the contractor. 29 Table 1 provides percentage values for performance bond costs. In the RSMeans cost data book for heavy 37 construction (12), the cost of bonds for highways and bridges is listed as a range from 0.4 to 0.93 1 percent of total contract value. According to the SFAA (10), the cost of performance bond 2 premiums on projects typically ranged from 2 percent of total contract cost for small projects (i.e., 3 those valued at less than $100,000) to 0.5 percent for very sizable projects (i.e., those valued at 4 more than $50 million). Meanwhile, the administrative costs of performance bonds are the costs associated with the 10 DOTs' additional staffing required to manage the performance bond process. From the case 11 studies, the authors found that the required staff ranges between 0.5 and 1 full-time employee. 12 Then, the annual cost to administer the performance bonding process is estimated at $104,000 13 using the most costly option, regarding the required staffs, payroll cost, and work hours. Due to 14 the minimal cost compared to the premium cost of performance bonds, the annual cost to 15 administer the process is not included in the analysis of this paper. 16 17
Benefits of Performance Bonds 18
The benefits a DOT realizes from a performance bond are derived from three different phases of 19 the project: before the contract, during the contract, and after a claim is filed. The benefits received 20 by the DOT before the contract begins result from the typical long-term relationship between the 21 surety and the contractor and the surety's use of enterprise risk management to underwrite the 22 performance bond (10). The long-term relationship between a surety and a contractor allows the 23 surety to understand the contractor's business plan and assess the contractor's managerial capacity 24 to execute that plan. When a surety, as a creditor, uses the enterprise risk management approach 25 to underwrite a contractor, it gives the contractor the incentive to adopt the enterprise risk 26 management discipline in its own management and governance. The cost of each of these benefits 27 is included in the cost of the premium for the performance bond. 28
Sureties state that the benefits a DOT receives during the contract result from the surety's 29 effort to sustain a contractor during the project and the ability of the DOT to use the threat of 30 calling the surety to improve contractor performance. The surety can intervene to prevent failures 31 and losses in ways that the DOT cannot. The validity of this benefit is disputed in the industry. 32
During the case studies performed for this investigation, none of the DOTs had experienced a 33 surety proactively working with an at-risk contractor before the DOT reported a problem. On the 34 other hand, all five case study DOTs reported that the biggest benefit of a performance bond is the 35 ability to threaten to call the surety if the contractor's project performance does not improve.
36
After a claim is filed, the benefit the DOT receives depends on the option taken by the 37 surety to remedy the default. Once a project defaults, the surety can pay damages to the DOT, 38 assume the role of the contractor and complete the project, or hire a new contractor to complete 39 the project. The benefits of each option have a financial value, and the costs associated with these 40 benefits are included in the premium cost of the performance bond. 41 However, the DOT receives financial benefits from a performance bond only after a claim 1 is filed. A nationwide study on the cost effectiveness of performance bonds across 30 states (13) 2 provided data for 19,135 projects (see Table 4 shows the results from the current research case studies of five states between 2007 11 and 2011. Only one reported a default. Again, the average default rate was less than one percent, 12 and the financial benefits realized by DOTs were very little although they routinely spent millions 13 of dollars annually for the performance bonds. 14 15 
PERFORMANCE BOND PARADOX 18
Herein lays the paradox. All five case studies of DOTs were reluctant to eliminate the performance 1 bonding requirement in the face of objective information that shows that they are paying a 2 substantial amount of money to avoid exposure to a risk that rarely occurs. In Table 4 , it happened 3 once in over 8,000 projects and in Table 3 , the risk was realized 37 times in over 19,000 projects. 4
The disparity in the numbers combined with the amount of money willingly spent on bonding leads 5 one to the conclusion that since the tangible benefits do not exceed the actual costs, that 6 performance bonds must be furnishing intangible benefits not shown in the numbers to justify the 7 expenditure of scarce public funding. 8 9
DOT and Contractor Perspective on Performance Bond 10
The default rate for the industry is less than one percent, which indicates that it is a statistically 11 random and infrequent event. DOTs protect themselves against potential financial losses from a 12 default by requiring contractors to purchase performance bonds, though performance bonds have 13 not been shown to have a causal relationship in default prevention. The SFAA reported that 14 nationally, DOTs spent $300 million to $350 million in 2010 on performance bonds just for 15 resurfacing projects to cover the less than 1 percent chance of a default. Additionally, the case 16 study states spent $114,159,432 between 2007 and 2011 on performance bonds to be able to handle 17 the financial burden of one default. 18
However, when asked about abandoning the use of performance bonds during the focused 19 survey to the industry, DOTs were very hesitant to do so. The Vermont and Alabama DOTs noted 20 that they would be very uncomfortable if performance bonds were eliminated. The Vermont DOT 21 does not use risk management professionals because its projects are too small to justify their use, 22
and no projects defaulted between 2008 and 2010 (out of approximately 350 total projects). The 23 survey respondent from the Alabama DOT was not sure whether the DOT had a risk management 24 professional, nor could the respondent provide project default information for the Alabama DOT. 25
The South Carolina DOT respondent stated that it would be somewhat uncomfortable if 26 performance bonds were eliminated. The South Carolina respondent did not know if the DOT had 27 a risk management professional and reported 14 defaults on more than 1,000 projects from 2008 28 to 2010. 29
Even when the rate of default was considerably lower, two DOTs still noted the same level 30 of discomfort. The California DOT (Caltrans) and the Florida DOT reported that they are both 31 somewhat uncomfortable eliminating performance bonds, despite the fact that both have risk 32 management professionals on staff and that each only experienced six defaults between 2008 and 33 2010 (Caltrans completed over 1,800 projects and Florida completed over 1,300 during this 34 period.). The five DOT case studies also found that none of the DOTs were willing to totally 35 eliminate performance bonds from the prequalification process at this time.
36
In NCHRP Synthesis 390 (5), the 24 DOTs surveyed mostly expressed satisfaction with 37 the current bonding system's ability to identify competent construction contractors, as shown in 38 Table 5 . In fact, only the Florida, New Mexico, and Oklahoma DOTs noted that they were 39 dissatisfied with the current bond system. Florida has an extensive performance-based contractor 40 prequalification system and has been using it for a number of years. 41
Meanwhile, the survey to the contractors found that the most contractors did not believe 42 that the ability to furnish performance bonds provided a guarantee of competence (see Table 6 While most states do not advocate abandoning performance bonds, several did suggest that raising 11 the minimum project value requiring a bond needed to be raised. Currently, the minimum value 12 that requires a bond varies between $0 and $300,000. The Iowa case study found that the DOT's 13 current floor of $25,000 has been in place since 1934. Using the consumer price index to account 14 for the time value of money (14), $25,000 in 1934 would buy roughly $436,000 worth of road 15 construction 2013. Based on the previous benefit-cost analysis, projects with a contract value of 16 less than $10 million tend to experience a net cost from performance bonds. Also, more than half 17 of the state construction projects, by value and by number, are worth less than $10 million, as 18 shown in Figure 1 and The potential default risk would increase if the bond floor is raised. Thus, a 6 recommendation that the minimum value be at least $1 million and no more than $10 million is 7 made. At $1 million, 85% of current project value would still be bonded and a majority of projects 8 by number would not. At $10 million, the majority of projects would not require bonds. This 9 analysis shows, DOTs will be able to free up considerable amounts of money without incurring 10 significant added risk. 11
The potential savings from raising the floor was calculated for each case study DOT. The 12 total cost savings values were calculated by multiplying the total dollar amount for projects 13 awarded in each category shown in Figure 1 by the associated SFAA average performance bond 1 premium percentage from As previously stated, one of the contractors interviewed restricted its market to local projects. This 11 company was a recently created small business enterprise and the interview uncovered an impact 12 that has not been previously reported in the literature. This contractor stated that because company 13 assets were low, the bond premium it was quoted was more than three times the highest rate shown 14 in Table 2 . Therefore, even though the bond cost is a pass-through cost to the DOT, this small 15 business could not compete against marginally performing contractors whose balance sheet 16 contained sufficient assets to qualify for highest premiums in Table 2 on a project awarded to the 17 low bidder. This particular contractor had been in business for three years and had successfully 18 completed a number of paving projects over $1.0 million for agencies that did not require 19 performance bonds as well as a number of private developers. 20
The literature shows that while each individual surety has its own proprietary formula for 21 determining the total amount of bonding capacity for a given contractor on a specific bid day, the 22 amount is usually in the range of five to ten times contractor's net working capital (NWC) (15). 23 NWC is the difference between a contractor's current assets and minus its capital modifier, which 24 is an accounting factor derived from the net cash on hand at the time the bond is required. It might 25 range from zero if the contractor has a large amount of cash on hand to a large number if the 26 contractor has a low amount on hand. A high net cash position indicates a healthy current financial 27 condition and the ability to readily pay bills for labor, materials, and subcontractors, and thus forms 28 a metric to measure the potential for default due to inability to pay the bills when due. Thus, a new 29 business is doubly disadvantaged by the current performance bonding system because both its net 30 assets and net cash are typically low (2). Hence despite well publicized federal and state mandates 31 to stimulate the growth of new small business enterprises (16), requiring performance bonds on 32 the small projects that these new contractors typically can complete actually retards the growth of 33 the kinds of contractors the laws are trying to promote, and furnishes a sound social reason for 34 raising the floor on bonded construction projects.
35
While there is the ability to achieve considerable premium savings by raising the 36 performance bond threshold, there remains a risk, albeit small, that a DOT will still experience a 37 default. A DOT can further reduce the likelihood of default through the implementation of other 38 advanced contractor eligibility evaluation methods such as performance assessment system to help 39 screen out poorer performing contractors. If a default does occur, the DOT still can recover funds 1 from the contractor to offset the cost of default. Any unrecovered costs would be borne by the 2 DOT, but as the above analysis indicates, large savings in bond premiums can significantly offset 3 these costs. 4 5 CONCLUSIONS 6
This study has shown that while the quantitative benefits of the current performance bonding 7 system do not appear to exceed the costs that both owners and industry see intangible value in the 8 financial discipline the system imposes on contractors who want to compete for and build public 9 highway projects. It also proposed a rationale for improving the cost effectiveness of performance 10 bonding by raising the minimum project size where a performance bond must be furnished upon 11 award. Finally, the study identified a heretofore unrecognized impact on the growth of new small 12 construction contractors of the current system. Combining the quantitative, qualitative and social 13 findings of the research leads to the overarching conclusion that the performance bonding system 14 does add value to public works construction projects but it needs to be updated to bring statutory 15 constraints in line with 21 st Century conditions. 16 17
